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The Constitution as if Consent Mattered 
Tom W. Bell* 
INTRODUCTION 
How should respect for liberty inform constitutional theory? At 
present, libertarians favor an originalist approach, joining the Right in 
trying to reconstruct the understandings of those people, now long dead, 
who first ratified the Constitution’s provisions. Libertarians tend to reject 
the other major theory—the so-called “living” constitutionalism generally 
favored by the Left—on grounds that it strays from fidelity to the 
Constitution’s text. This brief paper offers a third approach, one that 
combines the best of originalism and living constitutionalism in order to 
maximize the consent of the governed and, thus, render constitutional 
authority as justified as possible. 
Its focus on consent makes this a libertarian constitutional theory, not 
the libertarian one. No single theory can plausibly claim that title, given the 
fractious nature of libertarians. These pages aim to show, however, that 
originalism does not deserve a monopoly on libertarians’ allegiance and 
that they will find an attractive alternative in trying to maximize the 
consent of the governed—what we might call a “consensualist” approach to 
the Constitution. 
Part I explains why libertarians, who transcend the traditional left-
right political spectrum, should also transcend the false dichotomy between 
originalism and living constitutionalism, combining the best of both in a 
distinctly libertarian, consensualist theory. That has the advantage, as Part 
II explains, of maximizing the consent of those governed by the 
Constitution, rendering its authority as justified as possible. Part III offers 
some consoling words to libertarians who hesitate to move beyond 
originalism. No constitutional theory can honestly be all things to all 
people. By way of full disclosure then, Part IV discusses some areas where 
a consensualist approach might generate policy results that libertarians 
disfavor. Part V airs some objections to consensualism and briefly answers 
them. 
 
 * This draft paper expands on a presentation given at the 2010 Students for Liberty Southern 
California Regional Conference, October 23, 2010, Malibu, California. For the PowerPoint presentation 
that accompanied that presentation, see www.tomwbell/writings/SFL2010talk.ppt. I thank Alexander 
(“Sasha”) Volokh, Joel Boyce, Tim Kowal, Larry Rosenthal, Larry Solum, Glen Whitman, Eugene 
Volokh, Mike Rappaport, Randy Barnett, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Gary Lawson, Tom G. Palmer, 
Aeon Skoble, and Ilya Somin for comments. 
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I.  CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN 2-D 
Most libertarians have encountered the Nolan Chart, an expository 
device that neatly explains how they transcend the typical left-right 
political spectrum.1 The Nolan Chart graphs out two kinds of rights: social 
rights—e.g., freedom of expression, religion, and personal autonomy—on 
one axis, and economic rights—e.g., freedom to own and exchange 
property—on the other. The traditional, one-dimensional, left-right 
spectrum straddles the middle of the two-dimensional Nolan Chart.  
Totalitarians, who disregard all rights but their own, anchor the chart’s 
bottom. Libertarians, because they respect both social and economic 
rights—indeed, because they generally regard social and economic rights 
as fundamentally indistinguishable—hold the high ground at the top of the 
Nolan Chart. Figure 1 illustrates. 
 
 1 See NOLAN CHART, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nolan_Chart (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
Although I use the popular nomenclature here, it bears noting that Nolan popularized the chart but did 
not originate it. See BRIAN DOHERTY, RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM 321 n.92 (2007) (attributing the chart 
to Maurice Bryson and William McDill). 
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Figure 1 
We can understand the bipolar character of contemporary 
constitutional law with a similar device. We begin by graphing 
responsiveness to the understandings of living people on one axis and 
fidelity to constitutional text on the other. Just as in the Nolan Chart, the 
chart’s middle band approximates the traditional, left-right spectrum. The 
left-hand side of the spectrum corresponds to living constitutionalism, 
which aims to render the Constitution relevant to current conditions by 
encouraging judges to read its text loosely. The right-hand side of the 
spectrum corresponds to originalism, which prefers the meaning of those 
who first ratified the Constitution’s text over its present meaning, but who 
at least take the text seriously.  At the chart’s bottom lies tyranny, where 
the Constitution means whatever those in power say. At the top, on the far 
side of the left-right divide, rises a distinctly libertarian position—one that 
aims to maximize the consent of those governed by the Constitution. This it 
does by seeking the plain, present, public meaning of the Constitution, an 
approach both responsive to present understandings and faithful to the text. 
Figure 2 illustrates. 
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Figure 2 
Reading a constitution typically calls both for interpretation (finding 
the meaning of the text) and construction (applying contestable 
interpretations to particular problems).2 A consensualist approach 
interprets the Constitution’s words according to their plain, present, public 
meaning—the meaning that we, the living, faced with claims of federal 
authority, give to the Constitution’s text. Consensualism constructs the 
words of the Constitution, applying them to the problem at hand, so as to 
maximize the consent of the governed. Specifically, a consensualist 
approach follows the same sort of rules of construction that common law 
courts routinely apply in cases involving standardized form agreements that 
allegedly bind individual consumers. In other words, we should not reify 
the Constitution, or indeed any founding political document, but should 
instead regard it as akin to a standard form agreement offering governing 
services on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to many relatively powerless 
individual citizen-customers. 
 
 2 Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL THEORY 
LEXICON (Apr. 27, 2008), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/04/ 
legal-theory-le.html. 
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Why pursue both responsiveness and textual fidelity? In order to 
maximize the consent of the governed. As the next Part explains in more 
detail, the consensualist approach derives from a theory linking the 
justifiability of subjecting someone to the jurisdiction of a constitution to 
the degree to which that person has consented to it.3 From the point of view 
of contract law—an instrument finely tuned to assess the justifiability of 
enforcing consensual agreements—constitutions look like standard form 
agreements (albeit ones formed under dubious circumstances). At least 
with regard to those provisions affecting liberties, rights, privileges, or 
immunities,4 applying contract law to the Constitution helps to maximize 
the consent of the governed. As a further safeguard and as a remedy for the 
ills of self-judgment, consensualism also calls for giving those who litigate 
constitutional rights a direct say over who will decide their disputes—a 
process already routinely utilized in private arbitrations.5 
Consensualism is not the only libertarian way to read the Constitution; 
many aspects of both living constitutionalism and originalism—indeed, 
their best aspects—also protect our liberties from political insults. 
Consensualism offers a compromise to those contesting views while 
drawing on both for inspiration. It moreover offers something new: a 
theory of justification designed to make exercises of Constitutional 
authority more normatively attractive than either originalism or “living” 
constitutionalism can claim. 
II.  MARGINALLY JUSTIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 
Few but those who have taken oaths of office have expressly agreed to 
the Constitution’s terms. That raises hard questions about the justifiability 
of federal power. As Lysander Spooner wryly observed: 
Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could bring into 
court a written instrument, without any signature, and claim to have it enforced, 
upon the ground that it was written for another man to sign? that this other man 
had promised to sign it? that he ought to have signed it? that he had had the 
opportunity to sign it, if he would? but that he had refused or neglected to do so? 
Yet that is the most that could ever be said of the Constitution.6 
In Spooner’s view, the Constitution has no legal authority because it 
makes no provision for individual citizens to sign on the dotted line (or, 
more pointedly, to refuse to sign it). Perhaps Spooner set too high a bar for 
 
 3 See Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of 
Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17 (2010). 
 4 Provisions pertaining to relations between government bodies, so long as they do not affect 
individual rights, privileges, or immunities, do not always raise the same concerns. A conflict between 
the executive and legislative branches, for instance, does not necessarily raise the problem of a vast 
difference in bargaining power; the two branches, in contrast to interactions between the federal 
government and an individual citizen, meet more or less as equals.  
 5 I refer here to citizen courts, an institution discussed in more detail below. 
 6 LYSANDER SPOONER, NO TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY 24 (1870), 
reprinted in LYSANDER SPOONER, NO TREASON AND A LETTER TO THOMAS F. BAYARD 24 (1973). 
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the Constitution by demanding it satisfy the strictures of contract law. 
Regardless, his complaint illustrates how the ideal of an expressly 
consensual exchange negotiated between equals serves as the measure 
when we have to calculate the justifiability of imposing constitutional 
authority on someone who at best only impliedly or hypothetically consents 
to it. 
Where Spooner saw only black or white, the discerning eye can detect 
shades of grey. A study of the common law demonstrates that we typically 
evaluate the justifiability of a social institution’s exercise of authority over 
an individual as not simply a matter of whether the person has consented to 
the institution’s jurisdiction, but how strongly the person has consented to 
it. Consent, and thus justification, varies by degrees. Application of this 
graduated consent theory generates assessments of justification that apply 
both relative to particular parties (rather than relative to the whole 
undifferentiated mass of humankind) and relative to alternative institutions 
(rather than relative to an unrealized ideal). Figure 3, below, illustrates. 
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Figure 3:  The Scale of Consent and its Relation to Justification 
Because it failed to satisfy the requirements to create a binding 
agreement under contract law, Spooner concluded that the Constitution had 
no legal authority. Graduated consent theory offers a more tempered and 
precise analysis, explaining that the U.S. Constitution may have a more 
justified claim to authority over a specific subject than institutions touting 
only weaker proofs of consent. That is not to say that the Constitution is 
flatly justified, completely and for everyone. Unless it can claim the same 
sort of consent that makes an express agreement negotiated between equals 
so indisputably binding—and as Spooner noted, it cannot—the Constitution 
can always stand to win more consent. Good patriots, ardent to make their 
country as justified as possible, would thus aspire for it to win as much 
consent as possible from those it governs. 
We can increase the justifiability of the Constitution by interpreting it 
in a manner most likely to maximize the consent of those it governs. How 
do we do that? By borrowing the interpretive tools that contract law 
(predominantly) and tort law (secondarily) have developed, over hundreds 
of years and through thousands of cases, to discern the proper boundaries 
of consensual transactions and the remedies for violating them. Applied to 
the Constitution, those rules suggest that we should interpret the document 
according to the understanding of the parties allegedly bound by it—the 
citizens and residents of the U.S. We should, in other words, give the 
Constitution its present, plain, public meaning. 
Though that approach to interpretation might strike legal academics as 
too simple-minded to guide the subtleties of Constitutional jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly avowed that “we are guided by the 
principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.’”7 Whether we should recur to the 
 
 7 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 
U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
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plain and public meaning of the words at the time of their ratification, as 
originalism would have it, or at the present, as consensualism would, 
remains a separate and contestable question.8 In either case, though, the 
Supreme Court at least nominally eschews giving the Constitution’s text a 
meaning discernable only in the case law rather than on the document’s 
face. 
Constitutional scholars distinguish between interpretation—the art of 
discerning the meaning of the Constitution’s text—and construction—the 
practical problem of figuring out what to do when that meaning proves 
elusive.9 I’ve thus far written about interpretation, explaining why 
graduated consent theory tells us we should read the Constitution’s text in 
light of the plain, present, public meaning of its words. The same graduated 
consent theory also tells us how to construct the Constitution when its 
words evade interpretation. Basically, to again treat the Constitution as 
much as a contract as possible, we should construct it as we would a 
standard form agreement, offered by its writer on a take-it-or-leave it basis, 
from an awesomely powerful party to a comparatively powerless one. 
Courts enforcing contracts formed in similar circumstances routinely read 
vague terms in favor of the party—usually a sole individual person—
presented the agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by the other party—
usually a soulless collective legal person, such as a corporation or a state. 
In the Constitutional context, that basically gets us to the presumption of 
liberty that Randy Barnett has eloquently defended (albeit on other 
grounds).10 
Another interesting result from consensualist constitutional theory: 
We should explore using citizen courts as an alternative to courts where 
only federal employees do the judging. No federal court would uphold a 
term of a standard form agreement, one offered by a gargantuan and 
powerful legal entity to a single natural person, providing that any disputes 
between the parties would be judged and enforced by its employees. If that 
holds true of commercial disputes between corporations and consumers, it 
also holds true of constitutional disputes between the federal government 
and those of us subjected to its authority. In no case can a party—be it a 
person, corporation, or State judge—judge his, her, or its own cause. 
It follows, then, that we can do better than having federal judges alone 
decide disputes between those who claim authority from the Constitution 
and those subjected to their claims. We could adopt any of several 
remedies, but it seems most prudent to simply adopt the same sort of 
procedure routinely adopted in commercial contexts: Have a panel of three 
 
 8 The passage from Heller continues a vein that makes its originalist leanings evident: “Normal 
meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that 
would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” Id. at 576–77. 
 9 See Solum, supra note 2. 
 10 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).  
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adjudicators, one chosen by one party, the other by the other party, and the 
third by those two adjudicators, decide the dispute. I have said more on that 
point elsewhere;11 it here suffices to note that consensualism tells us not 
only how to interpret and construct the Constitution, but also how to 
improve our mechanisms for judging it. 
III.  FOR RECOVERING ORIGINALISTS 
Most libertarians, to the extent they adopt any particular approach to 
the Constitution, tend to adopt some version of originalism—specifically, 
the original public meaning version.12 Randy Barnett, for instance, has 
argued, “the words of the Constitution should be interpreted according to 
the meaning that they had at the time they were enacted.”13 This section 
explains why libertarians should reconsider their allegiance to originalism. 
Originalism offers a relatively objective and certain means of 
interpreting the Constitution, especially when compared to the usual 
alternatives, which favor precedents and judicial discretion over plain 
language. The virtues of originalism stem more from its fidelity to the 
words of the Constitution, however, than to its fidelity to what those words 
used to mean. Textualism, not historicism, gives originalism its charms. 
For friends of freedom, originalism has the virtue of generating such 
substantively attractive results as limited government, the rule of law, and 
respect for individual rights. We can credit that both to the Constitution’s 
bold and timeless words as well as to the supermajoritarian constraints 
imposed on its ratification proceedings.14 Query, though, whether we 
should pick our preferred theory of constitutional meaning based solely on 
its substantive results. If so, we would favor libertarian philosopher kings 
over a Constitutional republic. Not just the results, but also the justifiability 
of our interpretive theory matters.15 
At any rate, it is not so evident that originalism offers the best way to 
maximize liberty. Reading the Constitution today from a pretended 
eighteenth century point of view sometimes bolsters individual rights, 
granted, as when District of Columbia v. Heller gave an originalist 
interpretation to the Second Amendment.16 In other areas, however, 
 
 11 See Bell, supra note 3. 
 12 Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism (Jan. 18, 2004), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_1.html. 
 13 BARNETT, supra note 10, at 89. Barnett so argues because the Constitution is written and 
“[o]riginal meaning follows naturally, though perhaps not inevitably, from the commitment to a written 
text.” Id. at 100 (emphasis added). That caveat suggests that Barnett at least sensed that respect for the 
written nature of the Constitution might entail not originalism, but something more responsive to the 
understandings of living subjects. 
 14 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 31 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 917, 925 (2008). 
 15 But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Pragmatism’s Role in Interpretation, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y. 901, 905 (2008). 
 16 But see below for an argument that a consensualist approach to the Second Amendment 
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resurrecting linguistic usages from over 200 years ago would threaten our 
twenty-first century rights, as when courts seek the meaning of such words 
as “speech” (arguably mere public oral presentations in the Founding era) 
or “cruel and unusual” (a phrase that evidently did not, and therefore in 
Justice Scalia’s view does not, bar public floggings).17 
Consensualism offers all the textual fidelity of originalism without 
getting stuck in imagined understandings from long, long ago. Indeed, by 
relying on the plain, present, public meaning of the Constitution’s text, 
consensualism can achieve greater exactitude than originalism—which 
relies crucially on a limited set of various and variously interpreted written 
documents to try to recreate patterns of linguistics—could ever offer. 
Originalism limits itself to long-dead authors. Today, in contrast, we can 
invoke a wide variety of mechanisms—polls, publicly edited 
encyclopedias, empirical studies of word counts and associations—to 
discern how the Constitution’s living subjects understand its words. And 
only our understanding—not the understandings of our long-dead 
predecessors—can bind us.18 
Originalists evidently admire the Founders, and rightly so. We can all 
appreciate the boldness of Thomas Jefferson, the wisdom of James 
Madison, and the independence of Benjamin Franklin. Those and others of 
their generation did not demand our allegiance to their reading of the 
Constitution, however. They realized that we would read it by our own 
lights, for our own times. They doubtless hoped that we would share their 
courage in casting off the dead chains of distant rulers for the living bonds 
of self-governance. Consensualism honors the Founders not by enthroning 
their opinions but by following their example. 
IV.  WHAT DOES A CONSENSUALIST GIVE UP? 
Eugene Volokh once observed that every constitutional theory ought 
to make its proponents sacrifice some policy that they care about deeply.19 
If not—if your constitutional theory generates all of and only your 
substantive preferences—the rest of us have reason to doubt its objectivity. 
What does a consensualist approach to the Constitution ask libertarians to 
give up? 
 
generates more powerful protections for rights to keep and bear arms than the originalist approach used 
in Heller. 
 17 Scott Baker, ‘Providential’: Scalia Defends Constitution in Lively Debate With Breyer, THE 
BLAZE (Nov. 13, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2010/ 
11/13/scalia-breyer-bandy-about-how-to-decide-cases/ (describing “a rare public debate” in which 
Justice Breyer proclaimed public flogging as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, while Justice Scalia 
countered that because such punishments were common in the Founding era, they would remain 
constitutional—though “stupid”—today). 
 18 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880 
(1996) (describing as “the central problem of written constitutionalism” the problem of binding present 
generations with the judgments of prior ones). 
 19 Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 813 (1998) 
(“Interpretation means sometimes having to say you’re sorry.”). 
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This section discusses three areas where a consent-based approach to 
the Constitution risks generating results that libertarians might find 
regrettable: with regard to the right to keep and bear arms, with regard to 
the federal welfare rights, and with regard to the proper scope of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the first 
case, consensualism arguably generates a stronger right to keep and bear 
arms than does the originalist approach—a result that might make even 
libertarians, to say nothing of other political persuasions, blanch. In the 
second case, consensualism arguably proves more receptive to the 
constitutionality of federal welfare than originalism does, a result that some 
libertarians would rue. In the last case, while its meaning remains 
somewhat shrouded in mystery, a consent-based approach to the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause would suggest a more parsimonious reading than 
some libertarians have voiced. 
A. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
At first glance, a consensualist reading of the Constitution appears to 
threaten the individual right to keep and bear arms—a matter about which 
libertarians care profoundly. The problem arises because the Second 
Amendment’s first two clauses—”A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State”—arguably qualify its last two clauses, “the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The 
recent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,20 because it affirmed that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms, somewhat eases practical concerns on that front. Because that case 
relied on an originalist reading of the Constitution, however, it leaves open 
the worrying possibility that consensualism poses a theoretical challenge to 
libertarians’ preferred policy. 
Or perhaps not. Under an argument I first encountered in the writing 
of Erwin Hass, the Second Amendment ensures the sanctity of an 
individual’s right to keep and bear arms even on a consent-based approach. 
Hass recognized in the Second Amendment a “gerundive construction” of 
the sort that classical Latin uses to highlight the tension between two 
contrasting clauses. With that in mind, Hass read the Second Amendment 
to say, “Because, on the one hand, the state needs an armed militia, the 
people, on the other hand, shall retain their own weapons to counteract the 
state.”21  
That interpretation, by recognizing the reference to militias to serve a 
cautionary role, comports nicely with the consensualist argument that we 
should interpret the Constitution’s language in conformity with the plain, 
present, public meaning of its text. Whatever its meaning in statute, case 
 
 20 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 592 (2008). 
 21 Erwin Hass, Arms and the Man, LIBERTY, Sept. 2010, at 12–13, available at 
www.libertyunbound.com/sites/files/printarchive/Liberty_Magazine_September _2010.pdf. 
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law, and commentary, “Militia,” as used elsewhere in the Constitution, 
evidently refers to a military body subject to tight federal control. Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 16 includes among the powers of Congress, “To provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States . . . .”22  Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 begins, “The President shall 
be Commander in Chief . . . of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”23 Even if, as the 
Constitution provides, each of the several states has authority to appoint 
officers and to train the ranks, they would carry the burden of “training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .”24 (Note 
well the use of the singular; the Constitution evidently favors to view the 
Militia as a single body, even if made up of parts from various states.) 
A citizen might thus reasonably fear Militias as a potential instrument 
of federal tyranny. That well-founded apprehension would shape the public 
understanding of “Militia,” as used in the Second Amendment, which 
would in turn help determine the plain and present meaning of the word. 
On that reading, the Second Amendment guarantees each subject’s right to 
keep and bear arms in order to pose a credible threat in extremis, and thus 
to discourage in due course, the overweening ambition of tyrants-in-
waiting.25 On that view, consensualism would require libertarians to give 
up their preferred approach to gun rights—basing them in the need for 
citizen militias—though it might leave them happy about the policy 
results—liberal access to arms.  
B. Federal Welfare Rights 
A consent-based approach to the Constitution threatens to generate 
another result that libertarians might find hard to welcome: A reading 
favoring generosity of benefits doled out by the federal government. 
Libertarians tend to favor a stingy government in any case, and one at all 
events limited to a few narrowly defined categories of expressly 
Constitutional expenditures, such as to “establish Post Offices and Post 
Roads;”26 to “raise and support Armies,”27 and to “provide and maintain a 
Navy . . . .”28 Arguably, though, a consensualist reading of the Constitution 
 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 25 This is not quite the same reading of “Militia” favored by proponents of what Glenn Reynolds 
calls the “Standard Model” of the Second Amendment, which instead claims that “the purpose of the 
Second Amendment is to ensure an armed citizenry, from which can be drawn the kind of militia that is 
necessary to the survival of a free state.” Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 473 (1995). Though Reynolds wrote those lines well before Heller, 
that recent opinion confirms that “the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for 
which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.” Heller, 544 U.S. at 599. 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
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would tell us that the plain, present, public meaning of “general Welfare,” 
first in the Preamble and then again in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, which 
grants Congress the power to provide for “the General Welfare of the 
United States,” equates to something very much like a federal dole. 
To that, a libertarian might well reply that the plain, present, public 
meaning of “general Welfare” in the Preamble and Article I, Section 8, far 
from authorizing special benefits for particular individuals or groups, limits 
the federal government to providing only such boons as help the United 
States as a whole. That counterargument probably carries at least enough 
weight to give “general welfare” a contestable interpretation, making 
further understanding of its meaning a matter of construction.  
Problematically for libertarians, however, that move arguably supports a 
reading of the Constitution that favors those who plead for the receipt of 
government benefits. Here as with standard form agreements generally, we 
should construe the terms of the putative agreement against federal power 
and in favor of individual citizens. 
Libertarians can and should reply that “general Welfare” precludes 
special legislation, that the Constitution’s express terms sharply limit the 
ways in which the federal government can collect revenue for 
redistribution, and that powers enumerated in Article I do not include 
anything so far reaching as the sort of federal welfare state we now witness. 
Still, it seems at least possible that a consensualist reading of the 
Constitution authorizes the distribution of certain benefits to which any 
given citizen might qualify. That will make libertarians uneasy, given their 
well-placed worry that bread and circuses beget declines and falls. Even if 
some system of “general welfare” qualifies as Constitutional, however, that 
does not make it mandatory or even prudent. Wise—and constrained—
lawmakers might realize that they cannot afford to buy the consent of the 
governed, but instead must earn it by modest restraint and effective action. 
C. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment says, in relevant part, “No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States.”29 What would a consent-based 
understanding of that clause entail? That somewhat confounding and 
obscure phrasing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause makes it easier to 
say how a consensualist would approach the problem than to say exactly 
what answer would result. It looks far from certain, however, that the 
interpretation favored by such libertarian stalwarts as Roger Pilon30 and 
 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 30 See, e.g., Kimberly Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS 
(Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/reviving-privileges-or-
immunities-clause-redress-balance-among-states-individuals-federal-government. 
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Tim Sandefur,31 in which the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects 
fundamental natural rights against state interference, would necessarily 
follow from a consequentialist approach. 
Although the plain, present, and public meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause hardly leaps from the Constitution’s text, applying to 
the clause the same sort of interpretative tools that courts routinely apply to 
standard form agreements brings out several salient features. Note first that 
“privileges or immunities” do not evidently mean the same thing as “rights 
or liberties,” but instead generally refer to special exemptions from 
generally applicable limits or obligations. Thus does Black’s define 
“privilege” as “[t]hat which releases one from the performance of a duty or 
obligation,”32 and immunity as “exemption from penalty, burden, or 
duty.”33 Presumably then, the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not 
apply to fundamental natural or constitutional rights or liberties. 
Further evidence that “privileges and immunities” means something 
special appears in the Constitution’s frequent use elsewhere of “right,”34 
“liberty,”35 and “freedom”36—different words that presumably have 
different meanings. Indeed, in the text immediately following the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause shifts to speaking of “life, 
liberty, or property.”37 The plain, present, public meaning of “privileges 
and immunities” thus points to special statutory or constitutional 
dispensations rather than to fundamental and universal rights or 
freedoms—to such things as the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus”38 
or the privilege against self-incrimination39 rather than to “freedom of 
speech”40 or “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.”41 
Alas for clarity, though, still other provisions of the Constitution cloud 
the matter. Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Constitution already provided, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”42 Any 
narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause thus faces the 
trenchant critique of Justice Stephen J. Field, dissenting in the Slaughter-
House Cases, who complained that if the clause refers only 
 
 31 See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND 
THE LAW (Cato Inst. 2010). 
 32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (6th ed. 1990). 
 33 Id. at 751. 
 34 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, VI, VII, & IX. 
 35 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 36 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 40 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 41 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially 
designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of 
the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing 
and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. With 
privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could ever have 
interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit 
such interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States always controlled any State legislation of that character.43 
Suffice it to say for now that the meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause defies easy interpretation and that its mysteries have 
persisted despite long arguments over the question. Respect for the consent 
of the governed suggests that we should follow the model adopted by 
contract law, which generally construes doubtful terms in favor of a 
consumer allegedly bound by a standard form agreement. Here, though, we 
construct uncertain Constitutional terms so as to safeguard the consent of 
consumers of governing services. The result: A broad reading of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
That may look like a standard libertarian result, but it comes from a 
consensualist approach rather than an originalist one. It also relies on some 
contestable assumptions; perhaps the plain, present, public meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause is not so hard to discern, after all. We 
should not look to academic musings to settle the question, however; we 
should see how objective courts would cope with the problem of 
interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause. I have elsewhere 
described how citizen courts could help remediate the problem of judicial 
bias in favor of state power over individual rights. Here, it suffices to say 
that the deliberations of citizen courts could tell us a lot about what the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause should mean. 
V.  OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS 
A. What if the plain public meaning of the Constitution’s words changes 
between the time of its ratification and the time of its interpretation? 
Linguistic drift sounds troubling in theory, but would not likely have 
much impact in practice. The plain public meaning of most of the 
Constitution’s terms has changed little over recent centuries. “We the 
People,” still means those who “ordain and establish” the Constitution; “no 
law” remains “no law.” Judicial drift—far more than linguistic drift—
poses a much worse threat to textual fidelity. Witness such absurdities as 
holding that “commerce” covers eating the fruits of your own labor,44 or 
that “for public use” allows private gifts.45 
 
 43 Slaughter-House Cases, 86 U.S. 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 44 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 45 Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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Linguistic drift—or more accurately, linguistic expansion—does 
happen, though. Witness “domestic violence,” a term now heard more often 
in reference to spousal abuse and related, intensely local, disruptions. The 
Founders evidently used the phrase in Article IV, Section 4 to mean 
something quite different: homegrown violent insurrection. Does it follow 
that a consensualist, applying one of the more recent and arguably the more 
common meanings of “domestic violence” would read Article IV, Section 4 
very differently today from the way the Founders read it over 200 years 
ago? No. 
As throughout legal interpretation, we must put the phrase in context; 
in this case, the tail end of Article IV, Section 4. Any contemporary reader 
of the words surrounding “domestic Violence” (to recur to the original 
capitalization) would understand immediately that the sentence refers to 
duties owed by the federal government to every state of the union. It does 
not make much sense to read the sentence as, “The United States shall 
guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and 
shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the 
legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) 
against violence in a household and between household members.” Does 
the Constitution really guarantee that, say, if Idaho’s legislature but asks, 
the federal government will protect the state from family squabbles? It 
beggars belief—especially when a much more sensible interpretation 
appears on the face of the text. 
But what if semantics have drifted so far over centuries as to 
completely obscure the original meaning of the Constitution’s text? 
Suppose, for instance, that in the fashion of some dystopic novel “freedom” 
had come to mean “restriction.” Our unfortunate future counterparts would 
then find that, to put it in present terms, the First Amendment says, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the restricted exercise [of 
religion]; or abridging the restriction of speech, or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .” That nightmarish perversion of 
the First Amendment renders it nearly senseless; indeed, the words 
arguably embody a self-destructing contradiction. Suppose they actually 
made some sort of sense to future folks, though. What then? 
In such a hypothetical world of upside-down semantics, a well-
intentioned originalist would presumably impose on the surprised and 
puzzled People a meaning exactly opposite to the one that they find in the 
text. Violating the plain, present, public meaning of a dystopic anti-
Constitution would in that case protect freedoms of expression, granted. 
That happy result should not blind us, however, to the risks inherent in 
empowering judges to run roughshod over what subjects now bound by the 
Constitution naturally understand its words to mean. Indeed, thanks to 
cultural and moral progress, the originalist approach to semantic drift looks 
more likely to generate unseemly results than welcome ones. Compare, for 
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instance, the current meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” with the 
meaning prevalent in late eighteenth century America. 
A consensualist can thus respond to the puzzle of semantic drift by 
saying, “The People get the Constitution as they read it now—not 
necessarily as the Founders read it centuries ago.”  Because the public (as 
opposed to judicial) meaning of the Constitution’s text has not changed 
much over hundreds of years, linguistic drift does not look very worrying 
in practice. But if everyday people start using “freedom” for what the 
Founding generation condemned, in the Declaration of Independence, as 
“Despotism,” they will have no grounds to complain that the Constitution 
has been misinterpreted 180 degrees off. Indeed, those poor souls would 
not even notice the semantic flip-flop that hypothetically worries us. They 
would, however, notice the results of that sort of anti-Constitution, a 
document that attacks rather than defends the rights of the People, and 
would probably end up writing a “Declaration of Submission” 
overthrowing the “Republic” and instituting a “restriction-loving 
Despotism.” Were we to watch that drama with the sound turned off, those 
odd-speaking revolutionaries would look just like American patriots 
fighting to protect their liberties from tyranny. 
The People—not judges or academic commentators—ordain and 
establish the Constitution. We should thus take seriously the People’s 
understanding of the Constitution’s text. If semantic drift has in effect 
given them a new Constitution, then it should stand or fall on its own 
merits. 
B. Suppose that the Constitution’s subjects wrongly believe something 
about it not consistent with the plain, present, public meaning of the text. 
Should the legal meaning of the Constitution—its application under threat 
of force—then accord with what the public expects politicians to do, or 
instead, with how, if presented with the Constitution, the public would 
understand that text? 
It bears noting that this hypothetical concern will not likely arise under 
a consensualist approach because, insofar as we can discern the public 
meaning of the Constitution’s words, it will almost always accord with 
public belief about the proper application of the Constitution. The public 
has ready access to the Constitution’s text and, while they might not know 
its contents in detail, the public understands—indeed, reveres—the fact that 
the Constitution exists in a physical document that has legal effect. If we 
take seriously the notion that “We the People . . . do ordain and establish” 
the Constitution, we must take the words following that preamble seriously, 
too. If some portion of the public expects from the political process 
something that the rest of us, having read the Constitution, understand it 
not to say, we can quickly and easily disabuse our fellow subjects of their 
ignorance by quoting the text. No gap between public expectations and 
public understandings would likely stretch wide or last long. 
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For the sake of the hypothetical, though, let us suppose that some 
member of the public zealously but erroneously believes that the 
Constitution guarantees something in fact not in the text—that fluffy 
puppies will never want for chew toys, say—or something expressly 
contradicted by it—that Congress can establish a national church, for 
instance. What then? 
Holding all else equal, we should want the legal meaning of the 
Constitution—its effective, nuts-and-bolts, coercively-backed 
implementation—to accord with public expectations. With regard to legal 
meaning, after all, the Constitution gains in justification the more it 
conforms to the consent of the governed. In cases where the public 
expectation about how the Constitution will be applied varies from the 
public understanding of the Constitution’s text, however, we have to 
choose between two different measures of consent. Apart from recurring to 
the ballot box—itself a method fraught with epistemological peril—we 
have no reliable way to measure unfounded and uninformed hunches 
among members of the public about what they expect from constitutional 
government. 
The consensualist approach thus favors borrowing from contract and 
tort law time-tested tools of interpretation and construction—tools well 
designed to measure and maximize consent. Those tools teach us to look 
first to the objective public meaning of a text, turning to such ancillary 
proofs as course of performance, past dealings, or (the closest analog to the 
sort of public expectations as issue here) parol evidence only secondarily. 
Such back-up proofs cannot trump plain meaning; they can at best only 
sharpen fuzzy meanings. If, then, some fool thinks that the Constitution 
guarantees chew toys for puppies and authorizes a U.S. Government 
Church, we rightly set aside that expectation as not consistent with the 
Constitution’s plain, present, public meaning. 
C. Does the consensualist approach err by bringing normative 
considerations to bear in deciding the meaning of the Constitution’s text? 
The supposed problem, here—tying meaning to normative 
considerations—merits some explanation. “When we make assertions 
about what an utterance means, we are making factual assertions about the 
world,” Professor Lawrence Solum cautions.46 “What words mean is one 
thing; what we should do about their meaning is another.”47 The objection 
thus arises: Consensualism breaches the fact/value firewall, letting 
normative considerations taint what should be a purely factual inquiry into 
meaning. 
 
 46 Lawrence Solum, Semantic Originalism, ILL. PUB. L. AND LEGAL RES. SERIES NO. 07-24, Nov. 
2008, at 1, 28. 
 47 Id. at 30. 
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The reply: Consensualism at most merely offers good reasons to 
interpret the Constitution in a manner likely to maximize the consent of the 
governed; it does not mandate any particular meaning. While normative 
considerations guide consensualism’s choice of interpretive strategies, in 
other words, the strategy, once chosen, determines the Constitution’s 
meaning in a value-neutral manner. In that, consensualism relies on 
normative considerations to the same degree as any other theory of 
constitutional meaning. We cannot avoid choosing when it comes to the 
difficult and contested problem of how to understand the Constitution. 
Most choose living constitutionalism or originalism, evidently because they 
think it best to do so. Consensualism offers a different option, one 
supported by different reasons. 
Why choose consensualism over alternative theories of constitutional 
meaning? Note first that the normative aspects of consensualism operate 
only hypothetically, on the assumption that we value consent. I have 
offered a transcendental argument why no moral agent can deny that claim, 
but even short of an undeniable proof, consent qualifies as at least a prima 
facie good in every leading moral theory.48 In that approach, I follow 
Randy Barnett, who carefully explains that his theory of liberty assumes 
certain preferences with regard to social ordering.49 Normative 
considerations in that approach operate not as mandates, all too likely to 
rouse objections from those who like to think for themselves, but rather as 
dry if-then explanations, offered solely as guides to those who share certain 
commonplace goals. 
Second, note that even if the choice between semantic theories does 
not ordinarily come freighted with moral considerations (itself a 
considerable assumption), the same does not evidently hold true for the 
choice between theories of constitutional meaning. Because our approach 
to constitutional meaning has coercive effects, our choice bears normative 
burdens not at risk when we wonder over how to understand such things as 
poems or news reports. A man might risk his fortune, life, and good name 
on what “Treason against the United States” means in the Constitution’s 
usage.50 I will not pretend to instruct linguists and literary theorists as to 
how they should determine the meaning of novels, songs, or the like, but 
neither should they claim that we must remain indifferent to the coercive 
impact of the choice between different theories of constitutional meaning. 
Third, even accepting the dryly positivist view that meaning is 
determined solely by patterns of usage, rather than by heartfelt normative 
preferences, we still face the question: Which pattern of usage counts for 
Constitutional meaning? What data set, in other words, should the 
 
 48 Bell, supra note 3. 
 49 BARNETT, supra note 10. 
 50 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. I argue for the narrowest plausible reading of those words in my 
article, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 999 (2005). 
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linguistically-minded jurisprude draw upon when interpreting the 
Constitution? An originalist will call for reviewing public speech patterns 
during ratification, whereas a “living” constitutionalist will call for charting 
usage in the opinions written by black-robed judges. The tyrant demands 
that we hew to the way he uses the Constitution’s words, narrowing the 
data set down to a single source. Consensualism adds yet another option to 
the mix: Interpret the Constitution according to prevailing usage among 
contemporary citizens and subjects of the United States. 
Even if any given semantic theory should operate free of normative 
influences, we still face a choice between various theories. Linguistics 
stand ready to help us discern meaning from the data set we feed into it, 
from Founding era texts (for originalism) to court opinions (for living 
constitutionalism) to a dictator’s ranting (for totalitarianism) to 
contemporary public usage (for consensualism). It remains for us, however, 
to decide which data set matters. Although we could decide the question by 
casting lots, that would represent an abdication of responsibility in 
instances, such as with regard to legal texts generally or to the Constitution 
in particular, where our choice will influence the application of coercive 
force. Normative considerations thus can and should come into play when 
it comes to choosing between various semantic theories, even if the theory 
we finally choose runs, machine-like, in a value-free manner. 
D. Doesn’t “meaning” mean something other than what consensualism 
suggests? 
The response to the prior objection explained why we face a choice 
between several theories of constitutional meaning. That opens the door to 
a follow-up objection: “meaning” has only one meaning—specifically, it 
refers to the way in which a word or statement fits into the linguistic 
behavior of a particular community. Which community wins the privilege 
of defining the Constitution? A living constitutionalist might claim, “the 
Constitution means what the Supreme Court says it means.”51 An 
originalist might favor the patterns of linguistic usage among those who 
first ratified the Constitution and its various amendments. A consensualist 
suggests looking for the Constitution’s plain, present, public meaning. 
Reasonable people evidently disagree about what “meaning” means. 
We cannot simply define away these honest differences of opinion. The 
matter calls for persuasive argument, not mere stipulation. 
Consider, therefore, whether Professor Solum’s argument for original 
meaning works. Solum asserts that “the meaning (or ‘semantic content’) of 
a given Constitutional provision was fixed at the time the provision was 
 
 51 The sentiment, offered nowadays as a lawyerly maxim, appears to have originated with Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who said “the Constitution is what judges say it is . . . .” Charles Evan 
Hughs, Speech at the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS 
HUGHES, 1906–1916 at 179, 185 (2nd ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1916). 
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framed and ratified.”52 He offers that as a non-normative claim, asserting 
that “it would simply be a linguistic mistake to interpret the” Constitution 
by light of the usage in any other community of speakers.53 It is not clear 
why only the linguistic usage among a text’s initial audience qualifies to 
establish the meaning of “meaning,” however. At the very least, that 
limitation does not appear required by the philosophy of language espoused 
by Paul Grice, whose “sentence meaning” Solum analogizes to his own 
public meaning of originalism.54 To the contrary, Solum himself admits 
that “texts and speeches can have ‘sentence meaning’ irrespective of 
whether the utterance is read or heard in spatial and temporal proximity to 
the occasion of writing or saying.”55 By analogy, the Constitution can have 
meaning when read by light of today’s usage, even though it was first 
written long, long ago. 
Rather than fixing the Constitution’s meaning to the time of its 
framing and ratification, therefore, it seems more plausible to understand 
both sentence meaning and Constitutional meaning as variables that depend 
on the usage of whatever linguistic community we care about. When asked 
about the Constitution’s meaning, in other words, we should seek the 
clarification, “To whom?” Consensualism replies, “To those currently 
subjected to the Constitution’s legal authority.” 
Why adopt the plain, present, public meaning of the Constitution? To 
maximize the consent of those it governs.  Common law courts have long 
struggled with the related problem of trying to respect both the power to 
enter into legally binding agreements and the right to avoid unwanted ones, 
and have wisely chosen to generally read a contract according to the 
meaning adopted by its parties. Consensualism applies that same general 
approach to the Constitution, favoring an interpretation that will maximize 
the consent of those governed by it, here and now, by seeking their 
understanding of the Constitution’s meaning. 
With regard to a contract or constitution, we should favor a 
meaning—more precisely, a theory of meaning—that will maximize the 
consent of those purportedly bound by the document. Making a legal 
relation more consent-rich increases its justifiability, helping to excuse 
coercive enforcement of the instrument. Preferring that outcome reflects a 
normative preference for mutual consent over unjustified bloodletting, 
granted, but that preference comes naturally to most social creatures. 
One might fairly say, then, that normative considerations lead 
consensualism to look for meaning in the usage patterns of living subjects, 
a mechanism that finds but does not preordain Constitutional meaning. In 
 
 52 Solum, supra note 46, at 2. 
 53 Id. at 4. 
 54 Id. at 34 39. 
 55 Id. at 35. 
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that, consensualism recognizes that nobody can justly claim the privilege of 
defining the meaning of “meaning.” 
E. Isn’t consensualism just a sort of originalism—one that uses present 
meanings because they largely concur with the original ones? 
As explained in the answer immediately above, consensualism makes 
a considered judgment in favor of seeking Constitutional meaning in the 
plain, present, public meaning of the document’s text. It thus expressly 
rejects the alternative, favored by originalists, of seeking the Constitutional 
meaning in the speech patterns of those who ratified it, centuries ago. 
Consensualism takes inspiration from the originalist’s fidelity to the 
Constitution. When it comes to understanding that text, however, 
consensualism stays in the present whereas originalism remains embedded 
in a particular historical period. 
We might thus understand consensualism as something like a livelier 
version of originalism, though both grow from common roots. Originalism 
once functioned very well at determining the plain, present, public meaning 
of the Constitution’s text—not just in the 1790s, but for many decades 
thereafter. In those early days, consensualism and originalism perfectly 
overlapped; the Founding generation could hardly help but rely on its own 
usage in interpreting the Constitution. Even today, the public meaning of 
the Constitution’s text remains much as it was two hundred years ago, 
making originalism and consensualism agreeable neighbors. But whereas 
originalism’s search for meaning remains wedded to the public usage at 
ratification, consensualism keeps moving forward, constantly updating the 
data set that determines meaning and always vying for the consent of the 
governed. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that to maximize the consent of those governed 
by the Constitution, we should read it according to its plain, present, public 
meaning, and construe vague provisions in favor of individual subjects. By 
combining the responsiveness of living constitutionalism with the textual 
fidelity of originalism, a consent-based approach captures the best features 
of both. At the same time, however, consensualism avoids the public 
choice pitfalls of vesting agents of the federal government with the sole 
authority to define the Constitution (a salient flaw of living 
constitutionalism) as well as the confusion and inequity that would follow 
from defining the Constitution according to a reconstructed understanding 
of those who first ratified it (originalism’s quixotic goal). We, too, ratify 
the Constitution; only our mutual consent keeps that grand bargain alive. 
So, too, then, should our meaning imbue the Constitution with such 
authority as it can justly claim. 
We must choose between various semantic theories of the 
Constitution. That choice has consequences. Should we empower unelected 
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federal agents to alone define the Constitution? The question answers itself. 
Should we instead define the Constitution in terms of how long-dead 
Ratifiers understood it? That strategy at least offers comparative certainty 
and some protection against inequity;56 originalism does have its virtues. It 
lacks, however, a convincing justification. Why, apart from those 
instrumentally useful ends, should meanings hidden in historical mist 
trump the Constitution’s plain, present, public meaning? When it comes to 
justifying contemporary government action, the consent of those who first 
ratified the Constitution counts for less than the consent of “We the 
People”57 who live under it here and now. 
 
 
 56 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 14. 
 57 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
